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Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage. This is true even if only one spouse has possession of the property. Just because one spouse is named on the title, deed, or account; one person receives the asset as payment for personal services (ie: salary); or the asset will not be paid until a future date (ie: retirement) do not make it separate property. There is a presumption that all property possessed by either spouse is community property. Separate property ownership must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The most common way of proof is by tracing the asset from the date of acquisition to present date.
Tracing how funds were acquired can be particularly difficult if funds have been deposited into an account which also contains monies which would be considered community property (ie: salary) has been deposited, the separate property may become commingled to the point that it is not possible or cost-effective to prove its continued existence.
Grounds For Divorce
§ 6.001. INSUPPORTABILITY. On the petition of either party to a marriage, the court may grant a divorce without regard to fault if the marriage has become insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marital relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation.
§ 6.002. CRUELTY. The court may grant a divorce in favor of one spouse if the other spouse is guilty of cruel treatment toward the complaining spouse of a nature that renders further living together insupportable.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.003. ADULTERY. The court may grant a divorce in favor of one spouse if the other spouse has committed adultery.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.004. CONVICTION OF FELONY.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.005. ABANDONMENT. The court may grant a divorce in favor of one spouse if the other spouse:
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.006. LIVING APART. The court may grant a divorce in favor of either spouse if the spouses have lived apart without cohabitation for at least three years.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.007. CONFINEMENT IN MENTAL HOSPITAL. The court may grant a divorce in favor of one spouse if at the time the suit is filed:
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.008. DEFENSES.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1362, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.
§ 6.102. ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE OF PERSON UNDER AGE 18.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.103. UNDERAGE ANNULMENT BARRED BY ADULTHOOD. A suit to annul a marriage may not be filed under Section 6.101 or 6.102 by a parent, managing conservator, or guardian of a person after the 18th birthday of the person.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.104. DISCRETIONARY ANNULMENT OF UNDERAGE MARRIAGE.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.105. UNDER INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR NARCOTICS. The court may grant an annulment of a marriage to a party to the marriage if:
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.106. IMPOTENCY. The court may grant an annulment of a marriage to a party to the marriage if:
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.107. FRAUD, DURESS, OR FORCE. The court may grant an annulment of a marriage to a party to the marriage if:
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.108. MENTAL INCAPACITY.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.109. CONCEALED DIVORCE.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.110. MARRIAGE LESS THAN 72 HOURS AFTER ISSUANCE OF LICENSE.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.
§ 6.111. DEATH OF PARTY TO VOIDABLE MARRIAGE. A marriage subject to annulment may not be challenged in a proceeding instituted after the death of either party to the marriage.
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 178, § 2, eff. Aug. 30, 1999; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1351, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.
§ 6.603. COLLABORATIVE LAW.
Added by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1022, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
Visitation in Texas is referred to as “possession and access.” Typically, the Texas courts permit the natural parents to work out an arrangement between themselves that they believe is best for the child. However, if the parents are unable to reach an agreement, the courts will issue an order.
In Texas, the terminology used to describe parenting time/access is different than in other jurisdictions. The parent exercising visitation is referred to as the "Possessory Conservator." The parent whose home is the child's primary residence is referred to as the "Managing Conservator."
Under the Standard Possession Order, visitation arrangements can have many variations. If parents cannot agree, child visitation will generally follow a schedule developed by the Texas legislature that is intended to be fair and workable for both parents in a wide variety of circumstances.
The Standard Possession Order is common in the State of Texas. There is a standard visitation order for parents who live less than 100 miles from each other. There is another standard visitation order for parents who live more than 100 miles from each other.
Under the standard order for parents who live less than 100 miles from each other, the non-custodial parent has access/visitation as follows:
For parents who live more than 100 miles from each other, the non-custodial parent has access/visitation as follows:
An order which deviates from the aforementioned possession schedules is referred to as a "Modified Possession Order." This means the terms of possession are changed from the typical standard possession order (explained above). The modified possession order terms will vary depending on the needs of the parents, the age of the child, and specific issues of the case.
The court considers the age and needs of the child, including the child's normal structure and routine, as well as the history of each parent's involvement with the child. If the visiting parent has already established a schedule of caring for the child overnight, it is unlikely the court will put new limitations on the visiting parent's schedule. If such limitations are put in place until a child reaches a certain age, the parent who has primary possession of the child is expected to cooperate with the visiting parent to insure the visiting parent has ample visitation time without unfairly disrupting the child's routine and environment. Both parents should also provide the other with a list of the child's schedule and routine while the child has been with him or her so the schedule may be maintained.
You may download a Texas Visitation Agreement (also known as a Joint Conservatorship and Possession Agreement) from our Texas Divorce Forms page.
February 2010
In a decision entered by the Texas Court of Appeals on February 4, 2010, in the matter Kee v. Kee 05-08-00013-CV (Tex.App.-Dallas 2-4-2010), the Texas Court of Appeals (Dallas) ruled that the alimony provisions of the parties' partition agreement were not controlled by Chapter Eight of the Family Code where the parties failed to set forth the factors warranting alimony, and made no reference in their agreement to Chapter Eight. Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the remedy of contempt was not available to the Wife for the Husband's failure to make the payments that were required of him under the Agreement.
Chapter eight of the Texas Family Code sets forth numerous factors for a trial court to consider in determining spousal maintenance. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.052. Moreover, spousal maintenance under chapter eight must be of limited duration and must terminate on remarriage. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 8.054, 8.056. Chapter Eight also provides for income withholding for spousal maintenance payments. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.101.
In the Kee case, the wife sought enforcement and contempt against her husband for his failure to pay alimony, as was agreed upon by the parties in their written Partition Agreement (the "Agreement").
The Appeals Court described the parties' Partition Agreement as follows:
That Agreement included a provision that, if the parties separated, Husband would provide monthly financial support for Wife and their two children in the amount of $3,400. The Agreement also provided that Husband would pay alimony in accordance with the support provision if the parties divorced. The parties were divorced on January 5, 2006. The divorce decree ordered Husband to pay child support and alimony for a combined total of $3,400.
The Appeals Court held that the parties' agreement for payment of maintenance was a private contractual obligation that did not arise from Chapter Eight of the Family Code. Among other factors, the Appeals Court noted that the Kees' Agreement lacked any specific reference to Chapter Eight of the Family Code, or the factors governing alimony which are set forth therein. The Court also noted that the period during which payment of alimony was to occur under the Kees' agreement exceeded the time period allowable under Chapter Eight. Finally, the Court further noted that the parties' agreement made no mention of the factors which necessitated payment of alimony.
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the husband could not be subject to contempt for his failure to pay alimony:
[A] private alimony debt is not contempt punishable by incarceration. Id. A legal obligation to support a spouse is enforceable by contempt, but a promise to pay contractual alimony creates nothing more than a debt.
Kee, 05-08-00013-CV (Tex.App.-Dallas 2-4-2010) (quoting In re Green, 221 S.W.3d 645, 646 (Tex. 2007)).
§ 8.051 FAM. Eligibility for Maintenance; Court Order
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997. Amended by Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 62, § 6.05, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 304, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999. Renumbered from § 8.002 and amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 807, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 914, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2005.
This article is provided for general information purposes only. This is not legal advice.
By: Marc A. Rapaport, Attorney at Law http://www.RapaportLaw.com
The Berry decision, and its financial consequences, should be considered when negotiating or drafting a Texas QDRO or marital separation agreement.
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